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The International and the Limits of History 
 
 
‘Everything within the whole progresses: only the  
whole itself to this day does not progress.’1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What is the meaning of the international for history? This, in its most concise form, is the 
question that underlay the controversy over the status of history in IR that ran more or less 
unbroken through the 1980s and 90s. That controversy might appear in recent years to have 
reached settlement and therefore to be closed. Even if no outright victory was achieved, over 
time history and its proponents undeniably regained legitimacy, the so-called historical turn, 
around the millennium, announcing a renewed commitment and the establishment in 2013 of 
the Historical International Relations Section of the ISA setting the seal on the process of  
revalidation. Indicative of this revival was that, in a statement article on history’s place in IR 
from 2008 by two of its foremost advocates in the discipline, John Hobson and George 
Lawson, the tables could be turned and even the once excoriated enemy welcomed, with the 
magnanimity of the victor, into the historical fold. There they noted that ‘even the apparently 
archetypal version of ahistorical IR – Waltzian neorealism – has been historically “filled in”’2 
by Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer and others, so demonstrating that neorealism itself could 
be won for history. The incorporation of the extreme case was just part of a broader assertion 
of history’s prerogatives in IR. Reframing the disciplinary record, Hobson and Lawson 
suggested that the anti-historical 80s and 90s should be regarded as an anomaly for a subject 
that has otherwise always accorded historical knowledge due importance, and, in the central 
claim of the argument, they proposed that the historical nature of all theoretical positions in 
IR ought now to be recognised: history should be acknowledged as the most catholic of 
churches, the ‘lowest common denominator’3 across the discipline, encompassing everyone. 
Such being the case, the question that their article ostensibly addresses – what is history in 
                                                 
1
 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Progress’, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), p. 149. 
2
 John M. Hobson and George Lawson, ‘What is History in International Relations?’, Millennium – Journal of 
International Studies, 37:2 (2008), p. 417. 
3
 Ibid., p. 434. 
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International Relations? – in truth becomes otiose, the only possible question, if history is a 
given, instead being a different, and narrower, one: what kind of history should be practised 
in International Relations? And it is this second question that actually forms the substance of 
the paper, theories being distributed across a spectrum according to their logic of historical 
explanation, from the macro–nomothetic to the micro–idiographic. As a result, the single 
open issue is where on this spectrum one is situated: what kind of history one does. The 
merits of each position are acknowledged and debate and disagreement are recognised as 
legitimate and welcome – ‘no one “owns” history’4 – but nevertheless one has to be located 
within. If history is common to all, if ‘we are all historians now’,5 then there is nothing 
outside the historical space. 
 
Framed in this way, not only has history re-established its importance and 
incorporated what appeared ahistorical, but, in a sweeping gesture, it has asserted ownership 
of the entire field – the history question is answered as IR is swallowed whole. However, the 
victory is not as complete as it seems, for it comes at a cost. In the same breath in which the 
claims of history are expanded, the scope of the term is restricted (the latter move enabling 
the former). The question of history has here become a question of historiography, of the 
preferred method of constructing historical narrative. As a consequence, what originally in 
fact animated the controversy is rendered invisible and is forgotten. The problem of history in 
IR, an issue that in its time generated such heat,6 is thereby neutralised or bracketed – but it is 
not resolved, because that problem was never a historiographic one. Rather, it was always 
located elsewhere. Although Hobson and Lawson’s question is specifically phrased as ‘what 
is history in International Relations?’, no sustained consideration is given to either of the 
basic elements of their own formulation.7 Nowhere is the international, as such, made an 
object of attention in the context of reflection on history. That, as the form of humanity’s 
political existence at a global level, it might have significance for historical consciousness 
and understanding goes unnoticed. Instead, the term ‘international’ here functions only as an 
indicator of disciplinary demarcation and is otherwise empty, denoting an unproblematic, 
                                                 
4
 Ibid. p. 417. 
5
 Ibid., p. 434. 
6
 ‘Totalitarian’ Richard Ashley once described neorealism as being, and not because it opted for the nomothetic 
end of the spectrum (Richard K. Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’ in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism 
and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 290). 
7
 These absences are equally marked in a subsequent amplification of the argument (George Lawson, ‘The 
eternal divide? History and International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, 18:2 (2010), 
pp. 203–26). 
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neutral space that as far as history is concerned is no different from the domestic, requiring 
no particular consideration in itself. Correlatively, theoretical reflection on history is 
exhausted in the surveying of different modes of explanation (meaning, essentially, causal 
reconstruction), the primary problem of which is held to be striking a correct balance of law-
like process and eventfulness. ‘History’, as a concept, is confined strictly within 
historiographic boundaries. As a consequence, fundamental dimensions of the question of 
history are excluded in their entirety, not even recognised: what history means as a mode of 
understanding and experience of the past; how in historical consciousness past, present and 
future are related to one another; how a temporal sense, to which the past and history are 
indispensable, is central to the constitution of subjectivity; how the form of historical 
understanding – what counts as valid knowledge of the past – is bound up with social and 
political form; how and why all of these have themselves changed historically; and so on. If 
the problem of history and IR is not one of historiography, then to the extent that the 
resolution is framed in those terms it fails, and the issue remains unresolved and ‘live’. 
Instead, for the substance of the problem to be grasped, it is to consideration of history in its 
wider dimensions, and their relation to the international, that one must turn.  
 
The intention of this article, therefore, is to open a different path for the discussion of 
history in IR. The purpose of revisiting the history controversy is certainly not to refight old 
battles or to stake out another position within the terms of the old debate but rather to look 
again at what was really at issue – what the problem was – and to address it in a new way. 
The interconnection of historical experience and understanding with sovereignty and political 
subjectivity has long preoccupied critical thought,8 and the argument here is centred on this 
nexus, developing it within the particular context of the international. It is concerned with the 
character of historicity of historical consciousness and political form. Given this, the 
discussion cannot be elaborated simply as a history of history, as that would presuppose the 
type of knowledge that is itself intended to be the object of critique. Rather, the mode of 
                                                 
8
 See, inter alia: Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments (Stanford, CA: University of Stanford Press, 2002); Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign 
Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998) and Infancy and History: the Destruction 
of Experience (London: Verso, 2007); Walter Benjamin, ‘Critique of Violence’, in Marcus Bullock and Michael 
W. Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol.1, 1913–26 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), pp. 236–52, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (London: New Left Books, 1977) and ‘Theses 
on the Concept of History’, in Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (eds), Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings, Vol.4, 1938–40 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 389–400. 
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enquiry has an affinity with what Giorgio Agamben has termed a philosophical archaeology.9 
It is an investigation into, in Agamben’s sense, the ‘prehistory’ of history, the manner of 
arising of historical consciousness, and its relation to sovereignty and the international. The 
argument is developed in three sections. The first is concerned to make plain what the 
‘history problem’ in IR is. It returns to the sharp end of the controversy, reviewing the way in 
which the issue of history in relation to the international was framed, primarily by thinkers 
associated more or less closely with Realism, and why the radical historicising critics reacted 
so strongly in opposition to the apparent denial of history in IR. The second turns to historical 
consciousness and recent work on the development of the concept of ‘the past’. It reads this 
together with the seminal studies by Reinhart Koselleck on the emergence of the modern 
Western sense of historical time and with the idea of modernity as a ‘regime of historicity’ 
orientated towards the future. The third then makes the connection of sovereignty and history 
– the new historical subject as the new sovereign political subject. It links together temporal 
and spatial form, history and the international, through the concept of boundaries in time and 
space. The conclusion draws the implications of the argument and sets out a different answer 
to the question ‘what is history in International Relations?’. 
 
The history problem 
 
At first sight it might seem odd that IR could be considered a ‘discipline without history’,10 or 
that there could even be serious debate about the significance of history for the subject. 
Surely there is as much international history to study as there is history of anything else?  
Doubtless, but to make this simple observation suffices to reveal that what was at issue in the 
controversy was the significance of history in an altogether different sense. That ‘things 
happened’, that there is an infinitude of international history to study, nobody denied. At the 
core of the dispute was, rather, the status of history as such, its meaning, in relation to the 
international. In this respect, what the history problem descended from and always revolved 
around was a question of a different order: one from the philosophy of history. An indication 
of its shape emerges in some remarks on the concept of progress by Theodor Adorno: 
 
                                                 
9
 Giorgio Agamben, The Signature of all Things: on Method (New York: Zone Books, 2009), pp. 81–111. For a 
discussion of philosophical archaeology, see William Watkin, Agamben and Indifference: a Critical Overview 
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), pp. 29–48. 
10
 Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648 Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations 
(London: Verso, 2003), p. 14. 
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Today reflections [on progress] come to a point in the contemplation of whether 
humanity is capable of preventing catastrophe. The forms of humanity’s own global 
societal constitution threaten its life, if a self-conscious global subject does not 
develop and intervene. The possibility of progress, of averting the most extreme, total 
disaster, has migrated to this global subject alone. Everything else involving progress 
must crystallize around it.11 
 
Adorno went on to note that in Kant’s construction of the logic of the historical process ‘the 
concept of history, in which progress would have its place, is emphatic, the Kantian universal 
or cosmopolitan concept, not one of any particular sphere of life.’12 However, this leads to a 
contradiction, for ‘the dependence of progress on the totality comes back to bite progress.’13 
Through societal integration on a global scale, the question of the meaning of history has 
come to exist most urgently at the level of the whole – ‘the concept of progress is linked to 
that of a fulfilled humanity, and it is not to be had for less’.14 But at that level humanity falls 
short because its own logic of political organisation as a fragmented totality does not let it 
attain the whole: it is globalised but without forming ‘a self-conscious global subject’. Still 
unknown to itself, humanity does not yet exist as such. If the question of progress has come 
to be located in the problem of global political form, that in turn reflects back upon the nature 
of the historical process: all history, all the progress of Spirit or development of modes of 
production, has always been within, but never of, the whole. The one level that now really 
matters was always, and remains, outside the dynamic of progress. So at that level there has 
been no real history because there has not been substantive, qualitative change that would 
transform the character of human existence. Instead, humanity’s mode of social and political 
organisation is no more rational, coherent and self-aware now, as a totality, than it ever has 
been.15 Despite inconceivable advance in so many fields of human endeavour, the self-
divided, subjectless whole itself remains outside and essentially unchanging. The problem of 
the rationality of history has thus come to depend upon the whole, but the whole exists only 
                                                 
11
 Adorno, ‘Progress’, p. 144. In a contemporaneous lecture series, Adorno added to these remarks: ‘[W]hat I 
mean by this global subject of mankind is not simply an all-embracing terrestrial organization, but a human race 
that possesses genuine control of its own destiny right down to the concrete details, and is thus able to fend off 
the unseeing blows of nature. On the contrary, the mania for organization, be it for an enlarged League of 
Nations or for some other global organization of all mankind, might easily fall into the category of things that 
prevent us from achieving what all men long for, instead of promoting that cause’ (Theodor W. Adorno, History 
and Freedom: Lectures 1964–5 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) p. 143). Only through a transformation in the 
nature of humanity’s socio-political existence, not merely its supplementation by international institutions or 
organisations, could a global subject come into existence. 
12
 Adorno, ‘Progress’, p. 145. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid., p. 144. 
15
 The non-progressive quality of the international is thereby revealed as the real substance of progress: ‘No 
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the 
megaton bomb’ (Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 320). 
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in absentia, continually posited by humanity’s forms of political organisation and equally 
continually denied by them. There is, still, no global subject – and where there is no subject, 
there is no history. History as universal, not merely particular, development has thus reached 
a block in this absence at the centre of global political form, an absence named, necessarily 
by indirection, in the term ‘the international’. 
 
 This historico-philosophical question of the not-yet-existent global subject formed the 
ground of the history controversy. In developing as a distinct field of study after World War 
II, IR attempted to articulate the relationship of international existence to historical time. 
While the Realist writers who principally shaped the discipline were far from ignorant of or 
uninterested in history, in light of twentieth-century experience they figured that relationship 
as fundamentally problematic. In the eclipse of so-called Idealism, notions of progress, 
harmony of interests and the advance of civilisation originating in the Enlightenment had to 
be discarded as naïve: there was no linear development of history to higher stages, no gradual 
pacific integration of humanity through commerce, and no civilisational step beyond war. 
Prudential statesmanship might avert or at least mitigate conflict in a fractured, fallen world, 
and a judicious amalgam of bright-eyed liberal vision and Realist worldly wisdom might 
perhaps be contrived, but that was the limit of expectation.16 In the realm of international 
politics, it was necessary first and foremost to recognise, accept and work within the 
persisting fact of fragmentation and the immemorial realities of power, security and raison 
d’état. The division that produced such fragmentation was placed at the conceptual centre of 
the texts that pressed hardest upon the problem of history in IR. For Martin Wight, having 
surveyed anything that could be construed as relevant literature, international theory was to 
be discerned only as a shadowy para phenomenon, perpetually ancillary to the long tradition 
of political theory, and as such it had no coherent history of its own.17 Political theory 
necessarily developed over time, as society changed in its essence; international thought did 
not develop because international existence stayed essentially the same. Where progress 
could be attributed to the history of states ‘considered in isolation’,18 once set within the 
                                                 
16
 As argued by both E.H. Carr and John Herz in the attempt to produce a convincing blend of Realism and 
utopianism (E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: an Introduction to the Study of International Relations 
(London: Routledge, 2001) and John Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951)). 
17
 Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no International Theory?’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), 
Diplomatic Investigations: Essays on the Theory of International Relations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1966). For this failure, Wight blamed the ‘intellectual prejudice’ (p. 20) in favour of the state and the belief in 
progress. 
18
 Ibid., p. 26. 
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context of the whole such a developmental perspective disappeared: domestic advances might 
astound an observer from the past, but international conditions would be wearyingly familiar, 
‘the same old melodrama’.19 The achievement of internal progress sets into relief the 
obdurately different temporal character of the international, as the ‘realm of recurrence and 
repetition’.20 In this famous essay, the boundary between domestic and international thus 
marks a profound division between forms of life, demarcating one that knows history, politics 
and progress, where humans enjoy rational control of their own existence, from one that does 
not: ‘Political theory and law are maps of experience or systems of action within the realm of 
normal relationships and calculable results. They are the theory of the good life. International 
theory is the theory of survival.’21 Where Wight’s argument concluded with the strong 
distinction between inside and outside, Kenneth Waltz made this the premise of his structural 
theory. The flat, anarchic space of the international was strictly distinguished from the 
hierarchical, ordered internal space;22 everything else followed from that foundational 
division. This separation was made the organising principle of the theory in order to capture 
the effects of the fact that international existence, perpetually without overarching authority, 
does not cohere into a pacified, rational whole but instead remains fragmented and riven by 
conflict. Waltz readily acknowledged that ‘important discontinuities occur’23 in international 
history, but these could be explained by changes within political entities. The more profound 
problem, one that required a different sort of approach, was that despite all of these 
discontinuities the character of international existence had never been qualitatively 
transformed: ‘the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and 
events repeat themselves endlessly’.24 A ‘dismaying persistence’25 cancels the innumerable 
discontinuities, as all the change issues in no change. The borderline that separates anarchy 
from hierarchy is thus, in Waltz and in Wight, thoroughly temporal and historical in meaning, 
for it is ‘the enduring anarchic character of international politics [that] accounts for the 
striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia’.26 The spatial 
division – inside and outside – that enables the possibility of the good life has always carried 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid., p. 33. 
22
 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979) 
23
 Ibid., p. 71. 
24
 Ibid., p. 66. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid., p. 66. 
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with it a form of division in time – history and repetition. Just as the political entails the 
international, so the historical entails the non-historical. 
  
It was the publication of Theory of International Politics that provoked the history 
controversy, as Waltz, by formulating it in the boldest way, sharpening the antithesis for the 
sake of the unchanging, brought to a head the qualitative problem of the relation of the 
international space to time and history – the strong distinction he made between anarchy and 
hierarchy is simply another way of stating the absence of a global subject. It hardly needs 
saying that Waltz was perfectly aware that a substantial temporal span separated, for instance, 
the Peloponnesian War from the Cold War, but for the problem he was concerned with the 
continuity and identity across time were more revealing and mattered more: in international 
existence the present did not escape the past by decisively differentiating itself from it but 
simply repeated it in a new form. This apparent disregard for the significance of temporal 
distance gave rise to a furious response on behalf of history. The most straightforward mode 
of criticism was to accuse neorealism of being incapable of explaining history in an adequate 
way. The deliberate parsimony was too insubstantial and too rigid for the variety and 
complexity of the historical process: the wealth of actual history could never be reducible to 
such thin theoretical gruel.27 This criticism was, in its own terms, largely successful. But it 
was also beside the point, because the problem of history and the international, as formulated 
by Waltz, was not one of reconstruction of the historical process but was instead concerned 
with the qualitative ‘texture’ of international existence and its invariant character. In failing to 
appreciate what was actually at issue and remaining at the level of historiography, this 
criticism also missed the further implications of Waltz’s argument about the international and 
                                                 
27
 Such criticisms started, relatively gently, with John Ruggie (John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Continuity and 
Transformation in the World Polity: toward a Neorealist Synthesis’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism 
and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 131–57) and quickly became more strongly 
worded (see, for instance, Rodney Bruce Hall and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, ‘Medieval Tales: Neorealist 
“Science” and the Abuse of History’, International Organization, 47:3 (1993), pp. 479–91). Paul Schroeder’s 
interventions were particularly emphatic (Paul Schroeder, ‘Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory’, 
International Security, 19:1 (1994), pp. 108–48; Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman and Paul Schroeder, 
‘History vs. Neo-realism: A Second Look’, International Security, 20:1 (1995), pp. 182–95). This line of attack 
has not yet exhausted itself: see Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance and Zara Steiner (eds), History and 
Neorealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) for the most recent contribution. The vulnerability 
of Waltzian Realism on this score arguably reflects the transition from first-generation American Realism, with 
its roots in a German pre-World War Two intellectual context, to a new generation acculturated to very different 
intellectual mores. Waltz’s basic premise is a problem from the philosophy of history, but from that he 
attempted to construct a causal–explanatory, quasi-scientific theory of international behaviour. What is an 
important problem in the one field is far too insubstantial as a basis for explanation in the other. Hence the 
theory’s persisting power amidst continual confusion about exactly what and how much it is supposed to be able 
to explain. 
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history. Those implications were, however, not lost on his more radical critics, who were 
quick to interpret them as danger. Although they, too, generally pursued the historiographic 
critique, they added something else as well: a moral and political outrage at what was being 
done to history. For them, what was offensive in Waltz’s Realism, and sometimes in Realism 
as a whole, was more than just bad history – the denial of history was tantamount to a denial 
of freedom. So, critical theory, according to Robert Cox, because it is interested in promoting 
social and historical change, ‘reasons historically’.28 The new Realism,29 by contrast, should 
be recognised as ‘nonhistorical or ahistorical, since it, in effect, posits a continuing present’.30 
As such, it was conservative of the status quo. Richard Ashley likewise indicted Waltzian 
Realism as ‘a historicism of stasis’31 and ‘an apologia for the status quo, an excuse for 
domination’:32 it ‘denies history as process’, it denies ‘the significance of practice’, and, most 
heinously of all, it ‘denies politics’.33 For Justin Rosenberg in 1994, Realism was ‘the 
conservative ideology of the exercise of modern state power’.34 To recover ‘historical 
agency’, the activity, struggle and contestation that produce the historical process, from 
Realism’s deadening abstractions what was needed was ‘historical explanation’,35 which 
would show that ‘the history of the states-system has a live political content’.36 Ten years 
later, Benno Teschke repeated the theme, denouncing neorealism as ‘a science of domination 
[that] compresses the rich history of human development into a repetitive calculus of 
power.’37 Always, for these critics, what was most offensive in neorealism’s apparent 
ahistoricism was its political import. This was because, although ‘history’ was the continual 
cry, it was not primarily the past that was understood to be under threat: ‘Ignoring history 
does not simply do an injustice to the history of the international system. Most significantly, 
it leads to a problematic view of the present.’38 
 
                                                 
28
 Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory’, in Robert O. Keohane 
(ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 214. 
29
 In which Cox included Hans Morgenthau as well as Waltz. 
30
 Ibid., p. 209. 
31
 Ashley, ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’, p. 289 (emphasis in original). 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid., pp. 290–2 (emphases in original). 
34
 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: a Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations 
(London: Verso, 1994), p. 30. 
35
 Ibid., p. 160 
36
 Ibid., p. 37. 
37
 Teschke, Myth of 1648, p. 274. 
38
 John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in “Bringing Historical Sociology back into International Relations”? 
Transcending “Chronofetishism” and “Tempocentrism” in International Relations’ in Stephen Hobden and John 
M. Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 5 (emphases in original). 
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In the history controversy, at its sharpest point, ‘history’ thus in fact denoted its 
opposite: today and tomorrow, not yesterday. If, as a result of unhistorical ‘chronofetishism’ 
and ‘tempocentrism’,39 IR had ‘effectively written the issue of “change” off the international 
relations agenda altogether’,40 then the history problem was about the possibility of the new, 
transformation in the present, and the intensity of the conflict arose from its fundamentally 
political nature. Much more was felt to be at stake than simply debate over the merits of 
different historiographic preferences: denial of historical process and change was perceived 
to be denial of the capacity of humans to alter and shape their existence. The question of 
history in IR thus leads far beyond scholarly study of the past, into conceptions of liberty and 
political agency. This was always the real substance of the polemics in the 1980s and 90s. 
But why that should be so, why history should carry such political significance, was never 
made explicit in those debates and remains unexplored. To open up the history question in IR 
and make evident the proper dimensions of the problem of history and the international it is 
necessary to consider how modern historical consciousness, with its particular relation of past 
and present, is bound up with the modern form of subjectivity and political being and its idea 
of freedom.  
 
Past, present and future 
  
The typical move of the radical critics in response to neorealist ahistoricism was to affirm a 
strong distinction between past and present: to contextualise and historicise, putting the past 
into the past, in order to show the essential difference between then and now.41 What is the 
logic of this move? What experience of time and history is implicit in it? Why and how are 
history and freedom related? And, to begin with, what is the idea of the past that is being 
appealed to here? Though it may appear self-evident, ‘the past’, as such, is not simply a given 
of any and all historical thought but denotes a type of relation to what went before that took 
many centuries to come into being. Developing an argument of Constantin Fasolt’s, Zachary 
Schiffman proposes that to understand the historicity of ‘the past’, it is essential to see that 
intrinsic to the ‘distinction between past and present’ – the ‘founding principle’42 of modern 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., pp. 6–15. 
40
 Ibid., p. 12. 
41
 Representative is John Hobson’s complaint that in ahistorical IR ‘discontinuous ruptures and differences 
between historical epochs and states systems are smoothed over and consequently obscured’ (Hobson, ‘What is 
at Stake’, p. 9 (emphases in original)). Many of these critics are of course closely associated with historical 
sociology in IR. 
42
 Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), p. 4. 
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historical consciousness – is the belief that ‘the past is not simply prior to the present but 
different from it’.43 This presumption of difference brings with it modern history’s conviction 
that ‘each historical entity exists in its own distinctive context, [which] differs from our 
own’44 as well as its ‘most basic principle of method’,45 anachronism. Historians in the 
ancient world, so Schiffman argues, did not share this way of understanding history because 
they did not have a unified conception of ‘the past’. What they knew, instead, were multiple 
pasts, quantitative–linear and qualitative–episodic, not necessarily commensurable with each 
other.46 Likewise, they knew not a single time but multiple times, again linear and episodic 
and again relative to and incommensurable with each other.47 The strong conceptual division 
between past and present characteristic of modern historical consciousness had not yet been 
made.48 As a result, their relation to the past, qua object, was different: ‘instead of “the past,”’ 
ancient historians ‘conceived of things that had passed’.49 Nor was there a consistent sense of 
anachronism: to the extent that Thucydides, for instance, demonstrates an awareness of 
differences between past and present, he does so ‘without elevating that awareness to a 
principle of historical knowledge’ itself.50 These were not, however, simply primitive and 
inadequate attempts to articulate the past and history understood in modern terms. Rather, 
what they expressed were a different form of experience and a different form of subjectivity. 
Neither time nor the past had yet been unified and articulated to a single point located in the 
knowing subject. While ‘we expect a historian to view events … from a perspective that 
relates parts to whole, just as an artist orients the elements of a landscape in relation to a 
vanishing point’,51 how the self of the ancient historian related to the past precluded him from 
‘taking a perspective’ in this fashion and from objectifying the past in the same way – 
Thucydides’ ‘mental landscape’ was such that ‘he could not subordinate what we regard as 
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the second (and tertiary) to the primary levels of his argument.’52 This form of subjectivity 
and relation to the past also determined the ancient historians’ sense of the limits of human 
agency within a historical time that was understood as essentially repetitive. They did not 
share ‘our notion of “event”’53 and instead thought in terms of ‘occurrences’ – where ‘events 
generate novelty, occurrences catalyse predictable processes’54 that unfold with inexorability. 
The temporal and historical space of ancient history was thus throughout shaped by the way 
in which, in the absence of an emphatic distinction – a break – between them, what had 
passed continued to inform the present.55 
 
‘The past’ is therefore not an a priori but an ‘intellectual construct’56 and thus itself 
historical. The mode of experience of the past, and its meaning, changes with the form of 
subjectivity and the form of society. What, retrospectively, would be termed the Western 
sense of historical time of course developed substantially from the ancient world, first with 
the advent of Christianity – the relation of past, present and future being rearticulated in the 
Augustinian mind and through the idea of the saeculum – and then with the Renaissance’s 
simultaneous rediscovery of antiquity and relegation of the ‘dark ages’.57 However, only with 
modernity did ‘the past’ as a unified entity, decisively divided from the present, come into 
existence.58 This development was inseparable from the advent of the new Cartesian and then 
Kantian subject, through which the metaphysical and epistemological problems associated 
with the formation of absolute, Newtonian time were resolved: time was refashioned as 
abstract, homogenous and without limit, completely independent of and separate from any 
events that took place within it.59 These revolutionary developments, which turned the world 
inside-out, dividing the subject from the object and subordinating the latter to the former so 
that the validity of objectivity came to be articulated to and depend upon the subject rather 
than vice versa, transformed the sense of temporality and historical time. In the conceptual 
language developed in Reinhart Koselleck’s classic work on the character of Neuzeit, there 
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took place in Europe between approximately the 16
th
 and the 18
th
 centuries a rearticulation of 
the relation between the ‘space of experience’ and the ‘horizon of expectation’.60 The 
relatively close and closed connection between experience and expectation that had 
undergirded and stabilised previous ages was split open, the new social order being instead 
characterised by increasing disjunction between the two categories, so that as a principle of 
its own temporal logic ‘expectations … distanced themselves ever more from all previous 
experience.’61 The shape of historical time was thereby profoundly transformed, as an entirely 
new relation between past, present and future was gradually established. The past lost its 
binding authority over the present for a social form that increasingly felt itself to be in 
constant motion and to be subject to change as the innermost determination of its being. What 
was and what had been no longer, and less and less, served as reliable guides to what would 
be: history could no longer be exemplary. With secularisation and the fading of an 
eschatological perspective, a temporality was revealed ‘that would be open for the new and 
without limit’62 – soteriology gave way to infinity. At the same time, history was reconceived 
as a single, encompassing, immanent process, ‘history in and for itself’.63 Where the old 
society had been orientated towards the past, the new one, as expectation increasingly 
diverged from experience, drew validation from the future, which was in principle unknown 
and open. The category that more than any other encapsulated the character of this new sense 
of historical time was thus ‘progress’, which ‘opened up a future that transcended the hitherto 
predictable, natural space of time and experience’.64 Under the sign of progress, the present 
distanced itself to an ever greater extent from the past as it moved towards a new future, a 
new horizon of expectation.  
 
Consciousness of this new temporal character changed the relation to the past in 
further dimensions. The distinctiveness of the new necessarily contrasted in a virtually 
absolute way with the old, the past, the gone, which came to be understood as qualitatively 
different. The novelty of the new made it ‘possible to conceive the past as something that was 
fundamentally “other”’.65 Progress differentiated historical times so that the developing 
European modernity understood and defined itself as distinct from the past. It legitimated 
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itself no longer through continuity but through rupture. Just as the new was different, so each 
epoch of the past was itself distinct and unique, not continuous with the categories of the 
present but to be understood in its own terms. ‘The historical axiom of the singularity of all 
that occurred was … merely the temporal abstraction of modern everyday experience.’66 The 
new historical consciousness was founded upon radical difference and the individual quality 
of the historical event, as it ‘replaced the exemplary with the nonrepeatable’.67 Only in this 
way could history as process rather than repetition retain its requisite integrity. Released from 
a theocentric frame, the logic of causation in history was also transformed. Modern historical 
thought is based on ‘the conviction that mankind makes history’.68 Providential history, with 
the Last Judgement as its ultimate horizon, became secular history, governed by development 
and progress and stretching out into an unbounded future. ‘Henceforth history could be 
regarded as a long-term process of growing fulfilment which … was ultimately planned and 
carried out by men themselves.’69 Human beings, not the deity, acted in the world: they may 
not have made it under conditions of their own choosing, but they made history nonetheless. 
For historical consciousness to be historical and no longer theological the immanent process 
of history had to understood as being the product of the agency and activity of humans.  
 
The reshaping of historical and temporal space and the creation of a new form of 
historical consciousness thus rested upon a revolutionised view of human action in the world, 
which it continually affirms. ‘This is the view that human beings are free and independent 
agents with the ability to shape their fate, the obligation to act on that ability and 
responsibility for the consequences.’70 By virtue of this reductio ad hominem, history is tied 
in its own logic to what was a new form of practice, an unleashed and seemingly unbounded 
agency, freed from superannuated restrictions. Exigencies of circumstance might constrain 
that free agency, but it could never be essentially negated. That historical explanation would 
show the conditions shaping and limiting the possibilities of human action at any given time 
in no way gainsaid the belief in freedom and responsibility because ‘the technology by which 
such explanations are produced rests on the opposite assumption: that the bits and pieces 
historians use in order to construct their knowledge of the past are grounded in some human 
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action taken for some freely chosen purpose—as opposed to custom, providence or nature.’71 
History’s reliance on evidence bespeaks this assumption of freedom: what the evidence 
means may be continually subject to dispute but ‘that it testifies to something some human 
being did’72 underlies the use of evidence as the raw material of historical knowledge in the 
first place. It presupposes that the past is intelligible as the product of what human beings do. 
In the modern understanding, humans are elevated to the status of being both the agents and 
the locus of meaning of their own historical process, simultaneously its subject and object, 
and history, secularised, becomes the record of how they have created their own world. The 
subjects of history may be everywhere empirically constrained but they are transcendentally 
free. 
 
 Modernity in Europe thus produced a distinctive ‘regime of historicity’.73 Not only 
was this regime new, but it marked a reversal in the priority of terms unprecedented in human 
existence: just as in this social form’s philosophy the object was subordinated to the subject, 
so in its historical consciousness the past was subordinated to the future. As a result, the 
category of the future underwent a transformation. No longer was it simply a repetition or 
fulfilment of the past; rather, it moved away from it. The topos of historia magistra vitae, 
which had held sway since ancient times,  
 
was based on the idea that the future might not repeat the past exactly, but it would 
certainly never surpass it. And the reason for this was simply that everything took 
place within the same circle … was governed by the same providence and the same 
laws, and, in any case, involved human beings who had the same nature.74  
 
In modernity, that circle, which had held together past, present and future within a space of 
experience, was broken and the relation between the three terms was drastically rearticulated. 
Descartes had opened modern philosophy and announced the new freedom of the modern 
subject with a gesture of rupture – radical doubt that rejected received authority. The modern 
regime of historicity was founded on the same gesture – a break with the power of tradition 
and what had gone before. ‘The past was, a priori or due to its position (which amounts to the 
same), outdated’.75 Disenchanted and devalued, the past was divested of its authority, which 
was transferred to the future, towards which progress moved: ‘If history still dispensed a 
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lesson, it came from the future, not the past. It resided in a future that was to be realized as a 
rupture with the past, or at least as a differentiation.’76 Through that break, ‘the past’ as such, 
qualitatively divided from the present, came into being as the basic principle of historical 
thought, along with absolute, homogenous time and history in and of itself. All three were 
founded in the new, self-grounding subject and its freedom. That new philosophical and 
historical subject, created through forms of division, was also a new political subject, one to 
which lines of division were no less essential. 
  
Dividing time, dividing space 
 
Koselleck’s account of the transformation in historical consciousness that took place in early-
modern Europe is developed through his method of conceptual history, although he does, in 
passing, acknowledge that the new idea of historical time implied a new actual subject of 
history: ‘the bearer of the modern understanding of historical process was the citizen 
emancipated from absolutist subjection and the tutelage of the Church’.77 It is the link 
between history, as a new form of knowledge of the past, and socio-political transformation 
that Fasolt pursues. History, he suggests, was integral to the prolonged and violent struggle 
that occurred in Europe primarily in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries as the forces of what was 
eventually to become ‘citizenship’ sought to liberate themselves from the old order. This 
conflict between two forms of social and political organisation and authority – declining 
medieval feudalism and nascent liberal capitalism – was also, and not least, a conflict over 
time and the relation to the past. In this struggle history was not just one of the stakes but was 
itself a weapon wielded in the name of freedom, one aimed against the experience of the past 
embodied in the supremacy of the pope and the Roman emperor. At the apex of the stratified 
chain of power within medieval Christendom, the authority of pope and emperor derived 
from a claim to universality in space and time. This claim was made in full awareness of the 
chronological span separating medieval Europe from antiquity but those who made it judged 
that extent by a non-modern, non-historical standard, experiencing it not as division but as 
continuity; priority in time did not here entail difference. Both authorities, temporal and 
spiritual, ‘insisted that they were in communion with eternity, and both sought to embody the 
past as though it had endured over the centuries without change’.78 Contesting and ultimately 
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breaking the power of pope and emperor, and of the medieval form of life, meant contesting 
and breaking the particular coherence of past and present that held together the medieval 
shape of historical time. This was what the early-modern ‘historical revolt’ achieved. Its 
development of historical method and understanding, to produce what Koselleck identified as 
a temporalised sense of history, refashioned the relation of past and present. In doing so, it 
destroyed the unity of the medieval conception and thereby removed the grounds of validity 
of its political authority. This is the sense of Fasolt’s observation that ‘history jumped on the 
scene of European mental life with the force of a revolution against a specific form of 
governance’.79 A measure of the success of the historical revolt was that it ‘imposed a new 
periodization on history’,80 a new understanding of the shape of time and of the dynamic of 
the historical process. Dismissing as illusory the variety of temporal and historical schemas in 
use in Europe before modernity, historical consciousness in its revolutionary age naturalised 
as self-evident a tripartite division of history: antiquity, middle ages, modernity.81  
 
The emergence of modern historical consciousness was thus neither the replacement 
of a mystified religious conception by a properly secular one nor the result of the advance of 
disinterested intellectual enquiry. Instead, from its origins history was ‘at the service of 
European princes and republics seeking to emancipate themselves’82 and was both an 
instrument and a product of the overthrow of one form of society and polity and its 
replacement by another. In this sense, before all content, ‘history is in and of itself political’.83 
The work of history in destroying the medieval mode of imbrication of past and present was 
coextensive with the effort of emergent sovereign authority in liberating itself from empire. 
As the founding principle of modern political legitimacy and international order, sovereignty 
is generally understood as denoting, in simple terms, a state’s territorial delimitation and 
autonomy, its formal independence from any authority beyond its borders. However, 
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sovereignty should not be thought of as existing exclusively in the spatial dimension: 
‘freedom in space (and limits on its territorial extent) is merely one characteristic of 
sovereignty. Freedom in time (and limits on its temporal extent) is equally important and 
probably more fundamental’.84 To be properly self-determining and autonomous, a state must 
be sovereign in time as much as in space. It cannot be subservient to the superior power of 
the past. All the qualities Koselleck identified as characterising the modern sense of historical 
time – change, process, agency, orientation towards the future, the otherness and singularity 
of the past – relied upon the progressive differentiation of the present from the past, the space 
of experience from the horizon of expectation, and that process of differentiation, or rupture, 
which took several centuries to be accomplished, should be understood as expressing the 
developing realisation of sovereign freedom.85 Only once that freedom and self-determination 
in time had been established could a state consider itself sovereign and properly modern. ‘No 
state could be sovereign if its inhabitants lacked the ability to change a course of action 
adopted by their forefathers in the past … No citizen could be a full member of a community 
so long as she was tied to ancestral traditions with which the community might wish to 
break.’86 In the age of the historical revolt, sovereignty and citizenship were themselves the 
newly emergent horizon of expectation, the form of political order and identity that promised 
liberation and an open future. The conception of freedom operative in sovereignty and 
citizenship therefore demanded a severing of the ties that once bound the present to the past. 
The sovereign state and the autonomous citizen ‘require not only borders in space, but also 
borders in time’.87  
 
History was an essential part of sovereign authority’s effort to define itself as self-
validating and self-grounding and its effect in the early-modern European transformation was 
that of creating the temporal boundary. If it is indeed the case that ‘the two dimensions are 
inextricably bound together’ and that ‘changes in the experience of space always also involve 
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changes in the experience of time and vice versa’,88 then the implication of the claim that 
‘history is directly and systematically linked to citizenship, sovereignty, and the state’89 must 
be that the borders in space and the borders in time are inseparable from each other: no 
sovereign territorial space without sovereignty in time. The boundaries in both dimensions 
are homologous, integral to a single process of the reorganisation of political and social 
space–time. That restructuring, of which the historical revolt was an intrinsic part, culminated 
in the European continent’s division into sovereign nation states. These states in turn 
composed the core of the so-called Westphalian international system that over the following 
centuries was spread across the world through the empire building of the major European 
powers. This at first continental and then global reconstitution of political space – resulting in 
the modern international – was coextensive with the reordering of historical time on a 
matching scale. Just as European space universalized itself, so did European time: not for 
nothing was Weltgeschichte the culminating category of the new historical consciousness.90 
The precise bounding of nation-states in the new system worked both geographically and 
temporally, sharply distinguishing the inside from the outside and the present from the past. If 
the extent of the transformational process consequent upon the early-modern creation of the 
European state order is to be comprehended, it is therefore necessary to understand temporal 
and spatial reformulation together. To adapt the influential terms developed by Carl Schmitt 
in this context, the new nomos of the earth, which created the Jus Publicum Europaeum, was 
not only a spatial, territorial arrangement but also a temporal, historical one.91 Indeed, 
Schmitt’s core category of nomos as the process of ‘order and orientation’92 could be applied 
as much to time as to space: both were dependent on the drawing of lines. In his account of 
the logic of instantiation of geospatial order, Schmitt was at pains to make visible and specify 
the importance of the foundational acts of appropriation and division of land that lie at the 
origin of any formalised and stabilised political and social space, as providing a validating 
quality. Nomos, Schmitt avers, is ‘beyond a doubt … a fence-word’:93 ‘In the beginning was 
the fence. Fence, enclosure and border are deeply interwoven in the world formed by men, 
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determining its concepts.’94 The possibility of a concrete political order and of political 
subjectivity depends upon the originating moment of appropriation and division that turns the 
physical world into property. The subject grasps the world and makes it its own through 
division. In the same way, the production of modern historical consciousness should be 
understood as a new form of appropriation and division of time that decisively refigured what 
has passed as ‘the past’, the object of historical knowledge: ‘We draw a fence around a part 
of reality, call that the past, and mine it for knowledge in which historians specialize. That is 
the founding act of history.’95  
 
The intention of Fasolt’s book is to frame the question of history differently, to show 
the form of relation to the past implied in modern historical consciousness, and to draw out 
the consequences. When history’s purely historiographic appearance is stripped away, its 
political content and function can be made evident. In a move that, argumentatively at least, 
has a certain similarity, Schmitt, determined to reveal the gesture of sovereign decision that 
bestows vitality and authenticity on the concrete order of nomos, famously polemicised 
against legal positivism for obscuring the essential moment of origin, covering over the 
dynamic act of division with a reified and neutralised system of mere statute and law.96 The 
legal order tended always to hide the traces of its own foundation, taking on the appearance 
of a self-validating and self-sustaining system. If this is true of the sovereign division of 
inside and outside, how much more so is it the case in relation to history. Fasolt observes of 
the literature on the historical revolt that, while extensive, ‘it is itself chiefly historical in 
nature and therefore not always as illuminating as one could wish’,97 unconsciously caught up 
in a petitio principii of assuming the validity of history as a form of knowledge. Philosophical 
accounts of historical thought, meanwhile, generally take historical consciousness for granted 
and concern themselves with issues internal to the logic of history. Uncomprehending of the 
historicity and political nature of history, they are unable to grasp its ‘rise to prominence, 
much less its hold over our minds’.98 On the same theme, the editors of a recent volume on 
the subject of ‘Breaking up Time’ note that ‘although since the birth of modernity history 
presupposes the existence of “the past” as its object, “the past” and the nature of the borders 
that separate “the past”, “the present” and “the future” until very recently have attracted little 
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reflection within the discipline of history’.99 Such is the extent of the successful naturalisation 
of the modern borders in time that, they admit, very few historians have troubled to study the 
subject of historical time in depth. Instead, their time concepts, as well as those of 
philosophers of history, ‘are still generally based on an absolute, homogenous and empty 
time’.100 All of which suggests the difficulty of recognizing the distinctiveness of modernity’s 
regime of historicity, let alone trying to imagine beyond it, and so to bear out Fasolt’s claim 
that the borders in time are, if anything, of even greater importance to the freedom of the 
sovereign state and the citizen than the borders in space. The temporal division is so much 
now second nature that it has become almost invisible. However, once it starts to be revealed, 
the meaning of historical thought takes on a different aspect. ‘History only appears to be a 
form of knowledge about the past. In truth history serves to confirm a line between now and 
then that is not given in reality.’101 This is the function of the two basic principles of historical 
enquiry. First, the absolute distinction between past and present: whatever we may discover 
about the past from the interpretation of evidence, that can in no way affect (in fact it only 
reaffirms) the fundamental characteristics of pastness for historical consciousness, ‘absence 
and immutability’.102 The past is definitively gone and hence unchangeable; it exists on the 
other side of a line that it is forbidden to cross. Secondly, the principle of anachronism, the 
difference between past and present that is not to be violated: a prohibition that ‘places the 
past under a great taboo in order to prevent a kind of chronological pollution’.103 Seen from 
this perspective, modern historical consciousness and history are, as Fasolt suggests, before 
anything else political. They are part of the metaphysical security apparatus of sovereignty: 
their primary purpose is not to rescue the past for experience but rather to maintain the 
dividing line between the past and the present for the sake of the freedom of the modern 
subject.104  
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Conclusion 
 
The critique of history developed by Fasolt opens a number of perspectives on the question of 
history and the international. To begin at a basic level, with how the history controversy in IR 
played out, it reveals the shortcomings of the way in which the debate reached a conclusion 
and the insufficiency of the apparent victory of the cause of history. To frame the history 
question in purely historiographic terms is to be blind to what one might term the 
metaphysics of history as a form of knowledge and experience. That rendering of the history 
problem simply accepts without question the time concepts of modern historical 
consciousness. It does not enquire into any of the issues explored here: the relation of past, 
present and future, the borders in time, the political meaning of history, and so on. To be sure, 
it presumes these, but at the same time it removes them from view. Because of its narrowed 
conception of what is involved in thinking about history, it cannot see sovereignty and the 
international within history – that is, within the form of historical knowledge. The 
relationship between history and the international becomes wholly external, a matter of how 
historical method is to be applied to the subject matter of international history. So far from 
resolving it, the historiographic approach falls short of the problem of history and the 
international because it is unable to pose it in a way that reveals its proper dimensions. 
Instead, the ambitious claim made by Hobson and Lawson for the universality of history in 
IR resembles nothing so much as the imperious claim to universality across the international 
space made by the absolute time of European modernity, the temporal form integral to 
modern historiography.105 Both depend upon the drawing of sovereign borders in space and 
time; both, conceptually, have the international within them but without perceiving it. 
 
A similar difficulty besets the radical historicising critics of neorealism, and in an 
especially pointed form given the political role they want history to play. The argument 
developed here proposes that history, the nation-state and the international form a conceptual 
unity. As a category of sovereignty, history has within it the very borderlines and the inside–
outside division that generate the international and the problem of history in IR in the first 
place. Because they do not recognise this, the strong proponents of history find themselves 
caught up in a contradiction: to appeal to history against neorealism is to appeal to exactly the 
political subject that is constituted through the boundaries that neorealism insists upon. The 
agency of that subject, of which history is an integral part, can only ever repeat and 
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continually reinscribe the limits. Historicisation and contexualisation, putting the past into the 
past and demonstrating qualitative difference between then and now, the move so 
characteristic of the polemical use of history against perceived ahistoricism, is based upon the 
break with the past, the sovereign boundary between past and present, that produces the 
fragmented global political space of the international and its unchanging ‘texture’. The 
radical historicisers wanted to use history for a political reason, but they did so without 
understanding the politics already contained in history. During the controversy over history it 
seemed as if the critics occupied the politically progressive position: to be for history meant 
to be for agency and transformation, affirming a freedom to change the world; negating it 
meant denying the capacity of the political subject and upholding the status quo. However, if 
it is the case that history, in its concept, contains the boundaries that produce the ‘history 
problem’ in IR, then history and change perpetually reproduce their opposites, the ahistorical 
and the unchanging. These opposed positions, change and stasis, are, in truth, simply the two 
sides of the modern political subject, which created a new form of politics and a new 
conception of freedom but did so by dividing itself from the world through boundaries that it 
may not breach lest it cease to be a modern subject. The ahistorical Waltz, in whom the limits 
of history are most clearly delineated, is thus very much a part of history, and in an altogether 
more emphatic sense than the ‘nomothetic’ categorisation of the historiographic framing 
suggests. If the two sides are contained within each other, within a single political subject, 
then the contradiction of change and stasis, history and the international, cannot be resolved 
by taking one side against the other. Rather, the problem has to be framed differently. 
 
Doing so means rethinking the relationship between history and theory in IR. In light 
of the approach to history outlined here, this relationship cannot primarily be one of ‘testing’ 
theory against history – asking which theories best explain history and rejecting those which 
fail to make the grade. Doing so establishes history as an external standard against which 
theory is to be judged, a standard that, in the absence of properly theoretical reflection on 
history, is dogmatically posited. Instead, history, as a form of knowledge, should be subjected 
to theory. The problematic of the international is essentially concerned with the limits of 
political form, with the relation of inside and outside, and with the persisting absence of 
Adorno’s global subject. It therefore demands a critical theory of history. For if historical 
consciousness is inextricable from modern political form,106 then the problem of history in the 
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context of the international is one of the limits of history as an experience of the past. In IR 
above all, therefore, history cannot be simply history. Rather, the very subject matter of the 
discipline calls for critique of the relation of past, present and future and of the limits of the 
sovereign freedom that historical consciousness expresses. The fractured, anarchic political 
space of the international should be understood as dwelling within historical thought: the 
subject of history blocks the global subject. Seen in this light, there is a sense in which 
history in IR has hitherto been guilty of a sort of gigantic domestic analogy fallacy: taking the 
form of historical knowledge for granted, it has only ever been the history of the inside. But it 
is exactly that boundary line – inside and outside, past and present – that the problem of 
history and the international exposes to theoretical reflection.  
 
 Addressing the question ‘what is history in International Relations?’, then, requires 
understanding what the international means for history. For at least three centuries, the 
nation-state and the citizen were the bearers of history. Innovating the political form of 
sovereignty, they broke with received authority and opened a hitherto unknown futural 
horizon. The energy of that movement, as Europe expanded into the rest of the world with 
irresistible force, derived in large measure from the borderlines that released the European 
states from tradition, turning what had passed into ‘the past’. Progress – civilization as 
opposed to savagery, enlightenment as opposed to the dark ages, science as opposed to 
superstition – was the basic category of this temporalised history, expressing the new 
orientation towards the future. By the mid-20
th
 century, however, that dynamic had run its 
course. The historical energy had become exhausted and the borderlines had turned from 
being the medium of advance into a block, a barrier that thwarted the very movement it had 
once promoted. History reverted to repetition, progress to stasis, and futurity collapsed into 
the paralysis of presentism, in which the past was gone but the future no longer promised 
anything.107 With decolonisation, the sovereign state was universalised across the globe but 
no universal humanity, no global subject, resulted. Instead, the problematic of the 
international, the fragmented totality, made itself felt ever more insistently. The question of 
history and progress was elevated to the level of the whole but found no resolution there 
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because the whole exists only through the anarchic, subjectless form of the international. This 
is where the problem of history now lies. The subject of the modern regime of historicity was 
a sovereign–international one, whose historical consciousness was founded upon a decisive 
break with the past. The history problem in IR was, and is, based upon the insufficiency of 
that subject. So the question that the international poses to history is this: what would be the 
relation to the past of a new, global, subject? 
 
